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CGE Analysis, 2007 and 2011 
 
Hans G Jensen and Kym Anderson 
 
A recent World Bank research project has generated an annual time series of distortions to 
agricultural incentives over the past half century for 82 countries, the majority of which are low-and 
middle-income countries (Anderson and Valenzuela 2008; Anderson and Nelgen 2013).1 This new 
dataset can provide an alternative set of estimates of agricultural price distortions in developing 
countries to those provided for 2007 in the GTAP 8 database and 2011 in the GTAP 9 database (see 
Narayanan et. al. 2012 and forthcoming). This World Bank resource contains ad valorem 
tax/subsidy rates on outputs, inputs, imports and exports by country, for as many as 75 agricultural 
products (around a dozen per country on average). 
As explained in the methodology paper for the World Bank project (Anderson et al. 2008), 
these new estimates of the extent of price distortions in national economies are based on the ratio of 
actual domestic to border prices. They therefore differ from those in the GTAP database, which are 
mostly based on just applied rates of import tariffs. They should not be seen as superior to the 
standard GTAP distortions database, which in combination with detailed information on bound 
import tariff tariffs and agricultural subsidies in high-income countriers is meant for analyzing such 
things as multilateral and preferential trade policy reforms. Rather, the new dataset provides an 
alternative for those wishing to focus on the fuller range of distortions to national markets for farm 
products, as needed for analyses of agricultural and trade policies affecting developing countries.  
There are several situations in which the analyst may not want to rely on just applied import 
tariffs for analyzing the impact of, say, removing all distortions to agricultural incentives. One is 
that there may be ‘water’ or unused protection in such tariffs (because the government chooses to or 
finds itself unable to collect duties at the border), in which case the nation’s applied rate overstates 
the extent of actual protection from import competition for that product. It is also possible that 
nontariff import barriers exist to such an extent that an applied tariff understates the actual 
protection level. As well, production or export taxes or other export restrictions, or exchange rate 
distortions – generally not included in the GTAP protection database for developing countries – 
may be in place. And value added taxes on agricultural products may be applied at the border on 
imported products but not (or not as fully) on domestically produced like products. In principle, 
careful domestic-to-border price comparisons, appropriately adjusted for marketing margins, quality 
differences, etc., can overcome these problems and provide a more-accurate indicator of the price-
distorting effects of a country’s agricultural and trade policy measures. 
                                                            
1 In addition to the publicly available database, the project’s website ( www.worldbank.org/agdistortions) includes a 
lengthy series of background, methodology and working papers and underlying national spreadsheets. Country case 
studies are ublished in a series of four regional books (Anderson and Martin 2009, Anderson and Masters 2009, 
Anderson and Swinnen 2008 and Anderson and Valdés 2008) as well as a global overview volume (Anderson 2009). 
The four regional volumes, and a follow-up volume of CGE studies on the effects of those distortions on income 
inequality and poverty (Anderson, Cockburn and Martin 2010), are available as free e-books at 
http://go.worldbank.org/R34AP8DA80 
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The estimates of price distortions for developing countries from the World Bank’s 
Distortions to Agricultural Incentives (DAI) project are decomposed into trade or border 
instruments, including import and export taxes or subsidies, and domestic instruments such as farm 
output or input subsidies and consumer tax equivalents.  
This DAI database contains data for 71/68 individual countries found in the GTAP database 
for the 2007/2011 base years of the GTAP version 8/version9 database.2 As for specific 
commodities in individual countries, the DAI database provides an estimate of the nominal rate of 
assistance (NRA) to producers of the most-valuable dozen or so farm products that comprise around 
70% of the gross value of agricultural production in each country. The NRA is the percentage by 
which domestic producer prices exceed the border price of like products at the same point in the 
value chain. Hence the NRA is negative if producers receive less than the price they would have for 
a like product in the absence of government intervention. The NRA captures three domestic policies 
affecting agricultural producer prices, namely border measures (NRA_bms), output subsidies/taxes 
(NRA_dms) and intermediate input subsidies/taxes/import tariffs (NRA_i) so that 
 
NRA = NRA_bms + NRA_dms + NRA_i    (1) 
 
The sum of the border and domestic output price support measures are based on actual 
product price comparisons rather than applied tariff rates. In principle, careful domestic to border 
price comparisons can capture nontariff import barriers as well as producer price subsidies, 
production or export taxes or other export restrictions, or exchange rate distortions, most of which 
are generally not included in the GTAP protection data for developing countries. The reported 
contribution of the ad valorem equivalent input taxes (specific input taxes are multiplied by input-
output coefficients and summed up to obtain the combined NRA_i) can be added together with the 
border measure to give the total NRA estimate by commodity and country.  
Looking at consumer incentives, these are affected by border measures NRA_bms together 
with any domestic consumption taxes or subsidies affecting final consumers. In the present version 
of the DAI database for the years 2007/11, only border measures are affecting consumer prices, 
with a few exceptions. Hence there is no recalibration of the GTAP database’s domestic 
taxes/subsidies on private and government consumption already found in that database. 
 
 
Steps in putting NRA estimates into GTAP 
 
In order to recalibrate the GTAP database with NRA estimates, we draw on the latest version of the 
World Bank’s Distortions to Agricultural Incentives (DAI) database (Anderson and Nelgen 2013) 
to alter the GTAP database’s estimates of national support and trade restrictions. This involves 
revising the effort by Valenzuela and Anderson (2008), who made a similar adjustment to the 
Version 7 GTAP protection database for 2004. In particular, we introduce the NRA estimates of the 
actual price wedges at national borders and farm output and input subsidies/taxes, using an 
ALTERTAX closure of the GTAP model (Malcolm 1998). 
As mentioned, the DAI database for the year 2007/2011 covers 71/68 countries and a wide 
range of commodities. In order to aggregate the DAI database to GTAP concordance, a new 
program (DAItoGTAP) was written, using GEMPACK (Harrison et al. 2013), to process the NRA 
                                                            
2 The DAI database includes 2011 data for only 42 countries, but it has data up to 2010 for an additional 26 countries. 
So, in recalibrating the v9 database, those 2010 estimates of distortions are used as a proxy for 2011 (when international 
prices were similar to those in 2010).  
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data in a consistent manner and to document our approach. The DAItoGTAP program works as 
follows: 
 first, it aggregates the World Bank’s NRA data consisting of NRA_bms, NRA_dms, and 
NRA_i to GTAP commodity concordance,  
 Second, NRA_bms are allocated as price wedges at national borders as either import or 
export taxes in the GTAP database, depending on a country’s trade status as net 
exporter/importer,  
 third, GTAP output and input subsidies/taxes are brought into line with the 
commodity specific NRA_dms and NRA_i estimates so that the GTAP database mirrors 
the DAI database relationship, NRA = NRA_bms + NRA_dms,+ NRA_i, and 
 fourth, even though the DAI database also contains estimates of non-product-specific 
(NPS) assistance and decoupled payments (decpay), the DAItoGTAP program does 
not use this information and does not change the NPS and decoupled payments 
already found in the GTAP database, with the exception of a few developing 
countries,3 and 
 fifth, the DAItoGTAP program generates a shock file used in the ALTERTAX 
program to incorporate the DAI price wedge data into any aggregation of the GTAP 
database. 
 
 
Incorporating NRA_bms 
 
The aggregation of the DAI commodities to GTAP concordance in each country results in one 
NRA_bms(i,r)  measure to compare with the multiple ad valorem tariffs and export taxes found in the 
GTAP database for commodity i being imported from or exported to s countries to/from country r. 
We therefore make the assumption that the estimated NRA_bms(i,r) represents the average trade 
distortion on GTAP commodity i in country r.4  
More precisely, the NRA_bms(i,r) is measuring the percentage price difference between the 
domestic farm gate price PP and the world marker border price BP, 
 
NRA_bms(i,r)  = 100*(PP(i,r) - BP(i))/BP(i)    (2) 
 
In GTAP terms this would be equivalent to:  
 
NRA_bms(i,r) = 100*[sum(s, REG,(VIMS(i,s,r)/VIWS(i,s,r)))     - 1]  (3) 
                     or    
NRA_bms(i,r) = 100*[sum(s, REG,(VXMD(i,r,s)/VXWD(i,r,s))) -1]  (4) 
 
As the NRA_bms(i,r)  measures the percentage by which the domestic producer price differs 
from the border price, the question arises as to which border restriction is responsible for the price 
                                                            
3 The DAI database’s NPS and decpay estimates stem mainly from the OECD’s PSE tables. Since the OECD PSE 
tables already are the source of domestic support embedded into the GTAP database, the DAItoGTAP program makes 
no change to the land, labor, capital, and intermediate input subsidies/taxes already found in the database, where NPS 
and decpay support already are allocated. In some developing countries the DAI’s NPS estimates are calibrated into the 
GTAP database as homogenous intermediate input subsidies, which is added to the any commodity specific NRA_i in 
primary agricultural production. 
4 For the EU countries, intra-EU trade is excluded when calculating average trade barriers faced by non-member 
countries. 
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gap? In the DAItoGTAP program, this is determined by using the self-sufficiency estimate 
(domestic share in total use) calculated using the initial GTAP database. If the self-sufficiency ratio 
is above 1.01, we allocate the country to be an exporter, otherwise an importer.  
Since the NRA_bms(i,r) estimates are linked to primary agricultural products, which first have 
to pass through processing industries before being consumed, we aggregate the primary GTAP 
commodities pdr, osd, c_b, ctl, oap, rmk together with their respective processed products pcr, vol, 
sgr, cmt, omt mil before calculating self-sufficiency ratios in each country.5  
In a similar manner, when allocating the NRA_bms(i,r) border distortion for the primary 
commodities listed above, we also allocate the same border distortion to the associated processed 
sector. It is assumed for these products that the estimated price gap in the DAI database is at a 
higher level in the value added chain (processed products) and that wholesale prices (WP) are used 
instead of farm-gate prices (PP) for comparison with associated border prices (BP). The estimated 
relative percentage price gap (NRA_bms(i,r)) for the processed products is then allocated to the 
associated primary production at the farm gate in the DAI database. Using this assumption, we 
allocate the same border price distortion in both primary and the associated secondary processing 
industries found in the GTAP database.  
For GTAP commodities where the self-sufficiency is equal to or below 1.01, the country is 
classified as an importer. The NRA_bms(i,r) border distortions are then calibrated into the GTAP 
database by changing initial import tariffs. In the DAItoGTAP program two methods of 
incorporating the NRA_bms(i,r) as changes to import tariffs are available.  
The first method follows the approach used by Valenzuela and Anderson (2008), where the 
preferential bilateral tariff structures (TMS(i,s,r)) originally included in the GTAP version 8 
Database are maintained by multiplying each bilateral tariff by the ratio of the import tariff 
equivalent NRA_bms(i,r)  to the GTAP average tariff for each commodity. 
 
TMSNRA(i,s,r)  = RATIO(i,r)*TMS(i,s,r)    (5) 
where  
RATIO(i,r) = NRA_bms(i,r)/ 100*[sum(s, REG,(VIMS(i,s,r)/VIWS(i,s,r)))- 1] (6) 
 
By using this method, initial imports entering a country duty free maintain their zero-tariff 
status and it is assumed there are no additional trade distortions on goods entering from these 
countries. This means that we are assuming that all price gaps between the domestic and border 
prices are caused by the restrictions on trade with countries that do not have zero tariff access to the 
market. If the RATIO(i,r) is above/below one, then the average import tariff (equation (3)) has to 
increase/decrease. This is done in multiple steps in the DAItoGTAP program to exclude bilateral 
tariffs becoming negative when the ratio is below 1. In the special cases where there are import 
subsides, we reduce all tariffs to zero and allocate a homogenous import subsidy across all bilateral 
trades in that product. 
Even though we classify a country as an importer (self-sufficiency <= 1.01) in the GTAP 
database, these countries are often still exporting smaller amounts of the same commodity. This 
means that if there are any exports from a country where the NRA_bms is not zero, we also introduce 
export subsidies or taxes equivalent to the import barriers. This means that if the domestic price is 
above the world market price, for example, then an export subsidy has to be in place, otherwise the 
domestic producer would not export. In the GTAP database we found only one domestic price 
where for we had to implement this stylized approach in our representation of the NRA_bms in our 
alternative database.  
                                                            
5 For the EU countries the self-sufficiency ratio is calculated for the EU aggregated and not at the individual country 
level, thereby excluding intra-EU trade. 
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If a country is classified as an exporter (self-sufficiency > 1.01), we implement equation 4 
above by allocating a homogenous export tax or subsidy across all bilateral exports. Once again, if a 
country subsidizes exports then the average import tariff has to be as large as the export subsidy. If 
the average import tariff is below the export subsidy rate then the import tariff is raised using the 
method outlined above.  
A second method of adjusting import tariffs also is available in the code DAItoGTAP 
program. This can be activated as an alternative to the above approach which was used by 
Valenzuela and Anderson (2008). In this second approach, we assume the initial ad valorem 
equivalent tariffs already embedded in the GTAP version 8/9 databases are already captured by the 
NRA_bms. Using this assumption, we can the estimate the ad valorem equivalent of the non-tariff 
barrier (NTB) to trade as   
 
NTB(i,r) = NRA_bms(i,r) - 100*[sum(s, REG,(VIMS(i,s,r)/VIWS(i,s,r)))     - 1] (7) 
 
This second method then adds the NTB to the already present tariff structure found in the GTAP 
database, so that 
 
TMSNRA(i,s,r)   = NTB(i,r) + TMS(i,s,r)    (8) 
 
This method adds an NTB across all imported goods even where there are zero tariffs. It thus 
assumes that NTBs effect all trade equally. Estimating NTBs using this method will result in both 
negative and positive non-tariff barriers. The question could be asked if the trade-weighted average 
tariff used here is understating the trade distortion imposed by prohibitive tariff, in which case the 
estimated NTB in this second method is too large. The opposite could be said about the first 
method, which puts all the NRA_bms adjustment into the applied tariff, and thereby perhaps better 
reflects the trade distortion imposed by prohibitive tariffs – but then it could be understating the 
NTBs on initial bilateral trades with zero tariffs. 
 
 
Incorporating NRA_dms and NRA_i plus NPS 
 
Domestic support, in the form of output subsidies and intermediate input subsidies, is only allocated 
to the primary agricultural commodities found in the GTAP database. Output subsidies are changed 
to mirror the NRA_dms estimates: 
 
NRA_dms (i,r) = (VOA(i,r)/VOM(i,r) -1)*100    (9) 
 
In the case of intermediate input subsidies, the commodity specific NRA_i is the ad valorem 
equivalent of the sum of each individual input's NRA times its input-output coefficient. Thus NRA 
= NRA_bms + NRA_dms + NRA_i. But to get NRA_i into the GTAP database as an intermediate 
input subsidy, we have to reverse this calculation to get the correct shocks for the TFD and TFM 
taxes in the GTAP database This is done by dividing the NRA_i by the SHARE of intermediates in 
total demand for inputs and then using the relationship between the market price NRA(i,r) and the 
intermediate price to calculate the relative power of the input subsidies for domestic and imported 
commodities (equations 11 and 12).  
 
SHARE(i,r) =  sum(a, demd_comm,VIFA(a,i,r) + VDFA(a,i,r))/  (10) 
                      [(sum(a, demd_comm,VIFA(a,i,r) + VDFA(a,i,r))  
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                   +      sum(a, endw_comm, EVFA(a,i,r))] 
 
TFDNRA(i,r) = (1+NRA(i,r)/100 – ((NRA_i(i,r)/100)/ SHARE(i,r)))/(1+NRA(i,r)/100)  (11) 
 
TFMNRA(i,r) = TFDNRA(i,r)     (12) 
 
With regard to the NPS input subsidies, these are only issues for non OECD PSE countries. Since 
the DAI’s NPS input subsidies already are included in the GTAP database for countries where the 
OECD calculates a PSE, we make no changes to the GTAP database for these countries. For the 
remaining countries where the DAI database contains a value for NPS inputs subsidies we calculate 
a generic homogenous input subsidy rate (13) on all intermediate inputs (a) in primary agricultural 
production (i).  
 
NPSratio(r) =   - (NPS(r)/1000000) 
                      /sum(a, trad_comm, sum(i, primary,VDFM(a,i,r) + VIFM(a,i,r))) (13) 
 
This is then added to the commodity specific input subsidy rate. The calculated price relationships 
in equation 11, 12 and 13 are then calibrated into the GTAP database as homogenous input 
subsidies between the agent and market prices of intermediate inputs in non OCED PSE countries 
(equations 14 and 15) 
 
TFDNRA(i,r) + NPSratio(r)  =   VDFA(a,i,r)/VDFM(a,i,r)   (14) 
 
TFMNRA(i,r) + NPSratio(r)  =   VIFA(a,i,r)/VIFM(a,i,r)   (15) 
 
The above method of calibrating the DAI’s NRA for the year 2007 or 2011 has been 
programed into the GEMPACK file DAItoGTAP.tab. This TAB file also documents our approach 
and gives the end user the possibility of choosing between the two methods outlined above. 
 
 
Input/Output to/from the DAItoGTAP program 
 
The DAItoGTAP GEMPCK TAB file should be downloadable together with this document as well 
as the associated DAI data found in the DAI2007.har (DAI2011.har) file for the GTAP v8.1 (v9) 
database.6 Other files needed to run the program are the output from your aggregation of the v8.1 
(v9) database, Basedata,har, Default.parm and Sets.har (see the Readme document for how to run 
the program).  
The DAItoGTAP produces three output files, DAIshk.har, Altertax.prm and DAIview.har. 
The DAIshk.har file contacts shocks to import tariffs (tms), export taxes (txs), output 
subsidies (to) and intermediate input subsidies (tfd, tfm) for any specific aggregation of the GTAP 
v8.1 (v9) database. These shocks can then be used together with the Altertax.prm file to run an 
Altertax closure of the GTAP model (Hertel 1997), changing the initial distortions found in the 
GTAP database to the NRA estimates. 
The DAIview.har file containing an overview of the changes made to the GTAP v8.1 database 
is shown, by way of example, in Table 1.  
                                                            
6 When the GTAP v9 database is released, a DAI2011.har file will also become available. This can be used together 
with the DAItoGTAP program to generate shock files for changing the GTAP v9 database’s distortions to agricultural 
incentives.  
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Table 1. Overview DAIview.har 
 
 Header Coeff Name      
1 DAIG DAIgeneral DAI data with general information by country 
2 DAIC DAIcomREG DAI data with commodity specific information by country 
3 NRA_ NRA NRA = NRAbms+NRAdms+NRAi & production mill US$ 
4 BMS  NRAbms Border measures 
5 DMS  NRAdms Output subsidies 
6 I    NRAi Intermediate input subsidies NRAi + NPS 
 
 
Table 1’s first two headers, DAIG and DAIC, contains the original 2007 DAI data 
downloaded from the World Bank’s website. Two adjustments have been made to the original data: 
where TrStat2 was noted as x, m, h they are now coded so that x = 1, m = 2, h = 3 and Region is 
now Africa = 1, Asia (excluding Japan) = 2, ECA = 3, HIC = 4 LAC = 5. 
Header 3, NRA_ gives an overview of the NRAs used to recalibrate the GTAP database, with 
the exception of NotCovered commodities which is excluded.  
Taking c_b as an example in Table 2, the border measure NRA_bms is raising the domestic 
price by 83% compared to the world market price. So if the world market price is set equal to 1.0 
then the domestic Chinese price would be 1.83. The value of c_b at the farm gate is US$1,980 
million and the total value of primary agricultural production is US$428,180 million for the year 
2007 in China. 
Header 4, BMS, shows the result of the recalibration of the border measures in the GTAP data 
base. In this header the average import tariffs/subsidies and export taxes/subsidies are shown for the 
individual countries. 
 
 
Table 2. Header 3 NRA_, taking China as an example 
 
 NRA NRAbms NRAdms NRAi VOP_prod 
pdr -0.8 -0.8 0.0 0 41800 
wht 14.3 14.3 -0.0 0 19100 
gro 20.7 20.7 0.0 0 20900 
v_f 0 0 0 0 6180 
osd 9.3 9.3 0.0 0 5230 
c_b 83.4 83.4 -0.0 0 1980 
pfb 78.0 78.0 0.0 0 7490 
ocr 0 0 0 0 0 
ctl 0 0 0 0 0 
oap 1.0 1.0 0.0 0 155100 
rmk -25.5 -25.5 0 0 13400 
wol 0 0 0 0 0 
NotCovered 9.8 9.8 0 0 157000 
Total     428180 
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Taking China as an example again, Table 3 shows that the border measures are reducing the 
domestic price of rice by -0.8%. Since the self-sufficiency of rice is below 1.01, then China is 
classified as an importer of rice and the NRA_bms is classified as an import distortion (NRAbmsM). 
The initial v8.1 average import tariff is 17.0 (TMSold), which is then reduced to -0.8 (TMSnew). 
Since there is an import subsidy on rice we also impose an export tax of -0.8% (TXSnew). These 
measures are imposed on both commodities pdy and pcr in the GTAP database.  
Looking at wht, China is assumed to be an exporter of wheat and since the domestic market 
price is 14.3% (NRAbmsX) above the world market price, we implement an export subsidy. Since 
there is an export subsidy the import tariff has to be as large as the export subsidy, so we also 
increase the average import tariff from 1.4 to 14.3%.  
Since there is very little trade in c_b and rmk we maintain the initial GTAP distortions on 
these commodities and put the NRA_bms trade distortions on the refined commodities mil and sgr.  
 
Table 3. Header BMS border measures, taking China as an example 
 
 TMSold TMSnew NRAbmsM TXSold TXSnew NRAbmsX VOP_prod Self_Suff 
pdr 17.0 -0.8 -0.8 0 -0.8 0 41800 1.00 
wht 1.4 14.3 0 0 14.3 14.3 19100 1.03 
gro 1.9 20.7 0 0 20.7 20.7 20900 1.05 
v_f 3.5 0 0 0 0 0 6180 1.01 
osd 2.5 9.3 9.3 0 9.3 0 5230 0.76 
c_b 2.0 2.0 0 0 0 0 1980 0.96 
pfb 3.7 78.0 78.0 0 78.0 0 7490 0.72 
ocr 8.0 8.0 0 0 0 0 0 1.27 
ctl 1.9 1.9 0 0 0 0 0 0.97 
oap 8.4 1.0 1.0 0 1.0 0 155100 1.00 
rmk 0 0 0 0 0 0 13400 0.97 
wol 37.4 37.4 0 0 0 0 0 0.77 
cmt 10.5 10.5 0 0 0 0 0 0.97 
omt 7.9 1.0 1.0 0 1.0 0 0 1.00 
vol 1.6 9.3 9.3 0 9.3 0 0 0.76 
mil 8.8 -25.5 -25.5 0 -25.5 0 0 0.97 
pcr 2.5 -0.8 -0.8 0 -0.8 0 0 1.00 
sgr 0.2 83.4 83.4 0 83.4 0 0 0.96 
NotCovered 0 9.8 0 0 0 157000 - 
Total       428180  
 
The BMS header shows the implemented changes in average border distortions for the 71 
countries found both in the DAI and GTAP v8.1database. In a similar manner, header DMS shows 
the old v8.1 output subsidy rates (TOold) and the new NRA_dms rates (TOnew). In header I the 
same is done for intermediate input subsidies on imported and domestically produced inputs. 
In a similar manner, running the DAItoGTAP program together with the forthcoming 
DAI2011.har file and any aggregation of the GTAP v9 database will produce the same set of output 
files. These can then be used to change distortions to agricultural incentives in the forthcoming v9 
database. 
 
9 
 
 
How different is this alternative distortions database? 
 
As a way of exploring the difference between the 2007 GTAP v8.1 distortions to agricultural 
incentives and those provided from the World Bank’s DAI database, we simulated full liberalization 
of all agricultural and processed food markets globally in 2007 (using v8.1) and 2011 (using v9) of 
the GTAP Model. Three sets of welfare effects of such a reform are presented in Table 4: those 
using the standard GTAP protection database, those using the DAI database as transposed with the 
first (tariff ratio) method, and those using the DAI database as transposed with the second method 
(that assumes NTBs on agricultural products apply to imports from all trading partners).  
 The results in Table 4 reveal four sets of differences: across countries/regions, across the 
two years shown, across the two methods of transposing DAI estimates, and across policy 
instruments. Overall, they suggest the standard GTAP protection database, by not including 
measures other than applied import tariffs and input distortions for developing countries, leads to an 
underestimate of the global welfare effects of agricultural distortions. For 2011 the problem is 
relatively minor, but for 2007 the welfare effect is underestimated by at last one-third in all three 
regions.  
 The total welfare effect for all developing countries is much larger in dollar terms in 2011 
and 2007, especially using the GTAP database, but that is mainly because the developing 
economies are so much larger by 2011. When expressed as a percentage of GDP, the differences 
between the two periods is much less (see final two rows of Table 4).  
 As for the two alternative methods of dealing with import restrictions, when the estimated 
NTBs are applied to all trading partners including those with whom there is a zero-tariff 
arrangement, the estimated welfare cost of policies for many countries is slightly higher (i.e., the 
benefit from reform is greater) than with the ratio method, as is also true globally. 
 The most striking difference between the results from using the GTAP database and those 
from using the alternative DAI database stem from the different instruments used to distort prices. 
Table 5 subdivides the global welfare effects according to whether policies directly affect 
agricultural exports, imports, domestic output, domestic consumption, or intermediate farm inputs. 
It reveals that using the DAI database ensures that export taxes are taken into account. In both years 
they are estimated to account for around one-quarter of the global welfare costs of agricultural price 
distortions, and for as much as two-fifths in 2007, while the GTAP database suggests there are just 
minor export subsidies in place that slightly offset the adverse welfare effect of import restrictions. 
The extent of the price distortions as contributed by the various policy instruments in 2007, 
according to the GTAP and DAI databases, are shown for the major countries and residual regions 
in Table 6. 
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Table 4. Welfare effects on developing countries of full global agricultural liberalization of primary 
agric. and processed food products, 2007 and 2011  (EV, US$ million)  
GTAP v8.1 (2007) GTAP v9 pre release( 2011) 
Standard DAI database: Standard DAI database:
GTAP Ratio NTB GTAP Ratio NTB
China 8576 11174 11052 17855 23548 23556
Indonesia 1309 500 708 896 1305 1976
Malaysia 1745 2678 2917 2616 2947 3145
Philippines -144 -128 -136 129 396 384
Thailand 1899 3013 3084 3393 4233 4217
South Korea 6403 9434 9886 12047 10358 10408
Taiwan -178 94 95 -270 -278 -284
India 3468 2324 3435 4697 2281 5182
Pakistan -306 1845 1829 -15 56 36
Sri Lanka 92 58 -115 159 232 220
Bangladesh -185 644 698 -329 -112 -120
Rest of Asia 3449 3233 3379   5902 4346 4057
Asia 26128 34868 36833 47079 49311 52777
Mexico 706 798 781 393 1001 1016
Argentina 2889 6652 5886 4823 4988 4445
Chile 493 474 511 1152 1328 1395
Ecuador 357 1225 1184 1026 2926 2842
Colombia 300 1152 1166 1201 1991 1987
Brazil 10240 10977 10831 13960 11770 11911
Rest Latin America 1863 2783 2764   3152 3803 3700
Latin America 16847 24062 23123 25707 27807 27297
North Africa -591 477 504 -907 -219 -188
Morocco 145 153 329 393 425 469
Ghana 83 918 882 372 1420 1420
Egypt -87 2621 2733 1489 3257 3155
South Africa 743 1120 1152 1434 1549 1420
Madagascar 33 736 732 31 547 547
Burkina Faso 20 -50 19   34 41 42
Kenya 546 850 816 855 910 1004
Cameroon 57 45 50 64 81 77
Ethiopia 184 439 438 323 447 444
Tanzania 122 523 522 157 1181 1180
Uganda 94 181 180 158 395 393
Nigeria -55 190 229 -719 475 457
Mozambique 31 35 33 46 98 99
Rest of Africa 424 1750 1721   931 801 645
Africa 1748 9988 10338 4662 11409 11167
ALL DEV. COUNTRIES 45405 73459 74925 78139 93517 96288
% of GDP 0.34 0.55 0.56  0.36 0.43 0.44
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Table 5. Welfare contributions on developing countries from agricultural import, export, output and 
input price distortions in the full global liberalization of primary agric. and processed food products  
 
 EV           % contribution from policies affecting: 
2007 US$m Imports Exports Outputs Inputs Consumer Total
Standard 45405 52 -1 6 6 20 100
DAI--ratio 73459 38 28 6 4 15 100
DAI--NTB 74925 39 27 6 4 14 100
 
2011  
Standard 78139 50 -1 7 6 22 100
DAI--ratio 93517 36 22 5 5 18 100
DAI--NTB 96288 38 21 5 5 17 100
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Table 6. GTAP V8.1 and the updated GTAP DAI database’s agricultural price distortions, 2007  
(percent) 
    GTAP V8.1  DAI updated V8.1 (Ratio) 
Import     Subsidy   Import     Subsidy   
  Agriculture Tariff Export Output Input Factor Consumer Tariff Export Output Input Factor Consumer
Europe Prim. 2.1 0.1 0.3 0.8 27.5 0.2 2.8 1.9 0.2 0.8 27.5 0.2
  Sec. 3.6 0.6 -5.3 -0.5 0.0 -16.9 3.6 1.0 -5.3 -0.5 0.0 -16.9
Russia Prim. 5.5 -0.1 0.0 5.2 7.3 -4.1 8.2 -16.8 0.6 5.2 7.2 -4.1
  Sec. 17.7 0.0 0.0 -0.5 0.0 -34.9 26.3 10.2 0.0 -0.5 0.0 -34.9
Central Asia Prim. 5.4 0.0 -1.0 1.1 3.3 -1.2 5.3 -2.2 0.6 1.2 3.2 -1.2
  Sec. 11.5 0.0 -2.1 -0.2 0.0 -13.5 11.1 4.7 -2.1 -0.2 0.0 -13.5
Middle East Prim. 8.0 0.0 0.9 -4.5 4.2 -0.3 -3.5 4.5 11.5 -6.4 3.9 -0.3
  Sec. 13.7 0.0 -3.7 -0.4 0.0 -3.4 13.1 0.5 -3.7 -0.4 0.0 -3.4
USA Prim. 1.7 0.0 0.1 3.1 7.5 -5.0 1.6 8.2 -0.1 3.1 7.4 -5.0
  Sec. 3.0 0.0 -0.8 -0.2 0.0 -9.8 3.7 2.2 -0.8 -0.2 0.0 -9.8
Canada Prim. 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 21.2 1.7 1.1 0.7 0.0 0.2 20.6 1.7
  Sec. 17.0 0.0 -0.5 -0.1 0.0 -34.5 14.8 2.2 -0.5 -0.1 0.0 -34.5
Australia Prim. 0.3 0.0 0.0 5.4 4.7 -2.4 0.3 0.0 0.0 5.4 4.7 -2.4
  Sec. 1.5 0.0 -4.5 -0.1 0.0 -31.5 1.3 0.0 -4.5 -0.1 0.0 -31.5
Rest of Oceania Prim. 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 -10.0 2.1 1.3 0.0 0.2 0.0 -10.0
  Sec. 5.0 0.0 -0.5 0.0 0.0 -12.3 5.1 0.1 -0.6 0.0 0.0 -12.3
Japan Prim. 12.2 0.0 2.3 1.1 8.2 -5.0 12.6 25.5 1.7 1.1 8.3 -5.0
  Sec. 19.6 0.0 -8.4 -0.4 0.0 -5.0 24.0 3.1 -8.4 -0.4 0.0 -5.0
China Prim. 6.0 0.0 0.0 27.7 29.1 -0.4 16.1 3.1 0.0 27.7 29.1 -0.4
  Sec. 6.2 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -12.8 7.4 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -12.8
Indonesia Prim. 2.4 0.0 0.0 8.4 0.4 -1.1 3.2 5.4 0.0 8.4 0.4 -1.1
  Sec. 9.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -8.2 15.5 -3.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 -8.2
Malaysia Prim. 7.8 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.0 -3.7 5.1 2.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 -3.7
  Sec. 8.9 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 -8.0 9.5 -33.3 0.0 0.3 0.0 -8.0
Philippines Prim. 6.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -3.4 6.9 -13.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 -3.4
  Sec. 12.8 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 -5.3 10.7 3.5 0.0 -0.2 0.0 -5.3
Thailand Prim. 10.5 0.0 0.0 -1.6 0.0 0.0 5.9 2.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
  Sec. 14.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 -20.5 11.5 16.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 -20.5
Vietnam Prim. 9.2 0.0 -1.0 0.0 0.0 -2.7 9.2 0.0 -1.0 0.0 0.0 -2.7
  Sec. 16.6 0.0 -0.5 0.0 0.0 -17.7 16.7 0.0 -0.5 0.0 0.0 -17.7
RestAsia Prim. 0.7 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -1.2 0.7 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -1.2
  Sec. 2.0 0.0 -1.9 -0.1 0.0 -7.1 2.0 0.0 -1.9 -0.1 0.0 -7.1
South Korea Prim. 24.8 6.8 0.0 1.9 8.2 -3.3 66.0 91.4 2.8 2.0 7.8 -3.3
  Sec. 29.6 0.2 -12.1 -0.2 0.0 -21.7 50.2 3.0 -12.1 -0.2 0.0 -21.7
Taiwan Prim. 6.0 0.0 -0.4 -0.1 0.0 0.0 10.0 14.0 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.0
  Sec. 14.1 0.0 -6.8 -0.2 0.0 -0.6 19.9 2.7 -6.7 -0.2 0.0 -0.6
India Prim. 42.2 0.0 4.6 -0.7 0.0 1.7 3.2 2.2 0.0 24.0 0.0 1.7
  Sec. 78.8 0.0 -1.6 -2.6 0.0 -3.6 18.0 17.8 -1.5 -2.6 0.0 -3.6
Pakistan Prim. 6.2 0.6 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.5 3.1 -14.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.5
  Sec. 20.1 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 -11.3 17.5 -10.2 0.0 -0.2 0.0 -11.3
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SriLanka Prim. 13.8 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 14.3 14.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
  Sec. 22.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 19.1 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Bangladesh Prim. 4.7 0.8 -1.3 -0.3 0.0 0.0 -25.6 -28.9 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
  Sec. 9.0 0.0 -1.8 0.0 0.0 -1.7 7.0 -0.1 -1.8 0.0 0.0 -1.7
Mexico Prim. 5.1 0.3 0.4 9.4 8.1 -0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1 9.4 8.2 -0.1
  Sec. 2.7 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.0 -9.1 2.6 1.5 -0.2 0.0 0.0 -9.1
Argentina Prim. 0.7 0.0 -5.0 -4.3 0.0 -69.5 0.8 -26.2 -1.5 -0.9 0.0 -69.5
  Sec. 4.7 0.0 -2.2 -0.1 0.0 -37.2 4.7 -27.4 -2.4 -0.1 0.0 -37.2
Chile Prim. 0.7 0.0 -1.7 -0.4 0.0 -28.0 1.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.4 0.0 -28.0
  Sec. 1.8 0.0 -0.5 -0.2 0.0 -25.4 1.9 0.6 -0.5 -0.2 0.0 -25.4
Ecuador Prim. 7.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 -35.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
  Sec. 9.2 0.0 -1.4 -0.1 0.0 -3.1 1.3 -0.1 -1.4 -0.1 0.0 -3.1
Colombia Prim. 13.3 0.0 0.3 -1.4 0.0 -1.3 -0.4 -23.7 0.1 -0.4 0.0 -1.3
  Sec. 9.2 0.0 -0.7 -0.3 0.0 -13.4 -0.2 14.3 -0.7 -0.3 0.0 -13.4
Brazil Prim. 2.0 0.0 1.5 0.8 7.8 -8.8 2.4 1.2 1.6 0.8 7.8 -8.8
  Sec. 6.0 0.0 -0.8 -0.2 0.0 -15.2 6.4 0.4 -0.8 -0.2 0.0 -15.2
RestLAmerica Prim. 6.6 0.0 -0.5 -0.4 0.0 -2.4 6.6 -1.9 -0.5 -0.4 0.0 -2.4
  Sec. 12.6 0.0 -1.5 -0.1 0.0 -9.5 12.2 -0.3 -1.5 -0.1 0.0 -9.5
Nafrica Prim. 17.0 0.0 -3.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 17.0 0.0 -3.9 0.0 0.0 0.0
  Sec. 11.5 0.0 -4.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.5 0.0 -4.4 0.0 0.0 0.0
Morocco Prim. 25.9 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 27.1 21.6 -4.1 2.2 0.0 0.0
  Sec. 25.3 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 29.1 6.4 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
Ghana Prim. 6.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 6.7 -23.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2
  Sec. 16.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -7.4 17.9 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 -7.4
Egypt Prim. 2.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -4.1 -6.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
  Sec. 21.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.5 -5.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
SouthAfrica Prim. 3.7 0.0 0.0 1.7 6.0 -5.0 2.3 0.0 0.0 1.7 6.0 -5.0
  Sec. 9.2 0.0 -0.3 0.0 0.0 -14.3 8.0 7.8 -0.3 0.0 0.0 -14.3
Madagascar Prim. 4.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.4 -46.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
  Sec. 8.3 0.0 -0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 17.9 1.1 -0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0
Burkina Faso Prim. 4.9 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.3 3.8 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.3
  Sec. 8.6 0.0 -1.4 0.0 0.0 -5.0 8.6 0.0 -1.4 0.0 0.0 -5.0
Kenya Prim. 3.6 0.0 2.7 0.0 0.0 -0.1 9.5 -10.6 1.4 0.0 0.0 -0.1
  Sec. 22.7 0.0 2.8 0.0 0.0 -0.1 25.2 1.3 2.8 0.0 0.0 -0.1
Cameroon Prim. 10.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 9.8 -3.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1
  Sec. 16.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 -4.8 16.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 -4.8
Ethiopia Prim. 7.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 14.8 -14.2 2.5 0.0 0.0 -0.1
  Sec. 21.9 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -10.8 21.9 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -10.8
Tanzania Prim. 1.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -2.0 30.3 -17.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -2.0
  Sec. 21.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -11.0 26.5 9.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 -11.0
Uganda Prim. 7.2 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -2.7 7.2 -26.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 -2.7
  Sec. 19.9 0.0 -0.6 0.0 0.0 -6.5 20.1 0.0 -0.6 0.0 0.0 -6.5
Nigeria Prim. 6.3 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.2 6.8 16.1 -2.4 0.0 0.0 -0.2
  Sec. 20.6 0.0 -1.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.3 -0.4 -1.8 0.0 0.0 0.0
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Mozambique Prim. 5.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.4 5.2 -2.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.4
  Sec. 10.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -10.5 21.4 17.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 -10.5
RestSSAfrica Prim. 6.4 0.0 -0.5 0.0 0.0 -0.8 5.9 -15.4 -0.5 0.0 0.0 -0.8
  Sec. 13.9 0.0 -1.1 0.0 0.0 -8.2 15.9 0.2 -1.1 0.0 0.0 -8.2
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